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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we give novel certificates for triangular equivalence
and rank profiles. These certificates enable to verify the row or
column rank profiles or the whole rank profile matrix faster than
recomputing them, with a negligible overall overhead. We first
provide quadratic time and space non-interactive certificates saving
the logarithmic factors of previously known ones. Then we propose
interactive certificates for the same problems whose Monte Carlo
verification complexity requires a small constant number of matrix-
vector multiplications, a linear space, and a linear number of extra
field operations. As an application we also give an interactive pro-
tocol, certifying the determinant of dense matrices, faster than the
best previously known one.
1. INTRODUCTION
Within the setting of verifiable computing, we propose in this
paper interactive certificates with the taxonomy of [4]. Indeed, we
consider a protocol where a Prover performs a computation and
provides additional data structures or exchanges with a Verifierwho
will use these to check the validity of the result, faster than by just
recomputing it. More precisely, in an interactive certificate, the
Prover submits a Commitment, that is some result of a computa-
tion; the Verifier answers by a Challenge, usually some uniformly
sampled random values; the Prover then answers with a Response,
that the Verifier can use to convince himself of the validity of the
commitment. Several rounds of challenge/response might be nec-
essary for the Verifier to be fully convinced.
By Prover (resp. Verifier) time, we thus mean bounds on the
number of arithmetic operations performed by the Prover (resp.
Verifier) during the protocol, while by extra space, we mean bounds
on the volume of data being exchanged, not counting the size of the
input and output of the computation.
Such protocols are said to be complete if the probability that a
true statement is rejected by the Verifier can be made arbitrarily
small; and sound if the probability that a false statement is accepted
by the Verifier can be made arbitrarily small. In practice it is suffi-
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cient that those probabilities are < 1, as the protocols can always
be run several times. Some certificates will also be perfectly com-
plete, that is a true statement is never rejected by the Verifier. All
these certificates can be simulated non-interactively by Fiat-Shamir
heuristic [10]: uniformly sampled random values produced by the
Verifier are replaced by cryptographic hashes of the input and of
previous messages in the protocol. Complexities are preserved.
We do not use generic approaches to verified computation (where
protocols check circuits with polylogarithmic depth [12] or use
amortized models and homomorphic encryption [2]). Rather, we
use dedicated certificates as those designed for dense [11, 14] or
sparse [4, 5] exact linear algebra. The obtained certificates are
problem-specific, but try to reduce as much as possible the over-
head for the Prover, while preserving a fast verification procedure.
We will consider anm×nmatrixA of rank r over a field F. The
row rank profile of A is the lexicographically minimal sequence
of r indices of independent rows of A. Matrix A has generic
row rank profile if its row rank profile is (1, . . . , r). The column
rank profile is defined similarly on the columns of A. Matrix A
has generic rank profile if its r first leading principal minors are
nonzero. The rank profile matrix ofA, denoted byRA is the unique
m × n {0, 1}-matrix with r nonzero entries, of which every lead-
ing sub-matrix has the same rank as the corresponding sub-matrix
of A. It is possible to compute RA with a deterministic algorithm
in O(mnrω−2) or with a Monte-Carlo probabilistic algorithm in
(rω + m + n + µ(A))1+o(1) field operations [8], where µ(A) is
the arithmetic cost to multiply A by a vector.
We first propose quadratic, space and verification time, non-in-
teractive practical certificates for the row or column rank profile
and for the rank profile matrix that are rank-sensitive. Previously
known certificates have additional logarithmic factors to the qua-
dratic complexities: replacing matrix multiplications by quadratic
verifications in recursive algorithms yields at least one log(n) fac-
tor [14], graph-based approaches cumulate this and other logarith-
mic factors, at least from a compression by magical graphs and
from a dichotomic search [16].
We then propose two linear space interactive certificates: one
certifying that two non-singular matrices are triangular equivalent,
i.e. there is a triangular change of basis from one to the other;
the other one, certifying that a matrix has a generic rank profile.
These certificates are then applied to certify the row or column rank
profile, the Q (permutation) and D (diagonal) factors of a LDUP
factorization, the determinant and the rank profile matrix. These
certificates require, for the Verifier, between 1 and 3 applications
of A to a vector and a linear amount of field operations. They are
still elimination-based for the Prover, but do not require to commu-
nicate the obtained triangular decomposition. For the Determinant,
this new certificates require the computation of a PLUQ decompo-
sition for the Prover, linear communication and Verifier time, with
no restriction on the field size.
Table 1 compares linear quadratic volumes of communication,
as well as sub-cubic (PLUQ, CHARPOLY) or quadratic matrix op-
erations (one matrix-vector multiplication with a dense matrix is
denoted fgemv). The results shows first that it is interesting to use
linear space certificates even when they have quadratic Verification
time. The table also presents a practical constant factor of about 5
between PLUQ and CHARPOLY computations. Computations use
the FFLAS-FFPACK library (http://linbox-team.github.io/fflas-ffpack)
on a single Intel Skylake core @3.4GHz, while we measured some
communications between two workstations over an Ethernet Cat.
6, @1Gb/s network cable.
Dimension 2k 10k 50k
PLUQ 0.28s 17.99s 1448.16s
CHARPOLY 1.96s 100.37s 8047.56s
Linear comm. 0.50s 0.50s 0.50s
Quadratic comm. 1.50s 7.50s 222.68s
fgemv 0.0013s 0.038s 1.03s
Table 1: Communication of 64 bit words versus computation
modulo 131071
A summary of our contributions is given in Table 3, to be com-
pared with the state of the art in Table 2. We identify the symmetric
group with the group of permutation matrices, and write P ∈ Sn
to denote that a matrix P is a permutation matrix. There, P [i] is
the row index of the nonzero element of its i-th column; Dn(F) is
the group of invertible diagonal matrices over the field F and [A]IJ
is the (I, J)-minor of the matrix A (the determinant of the subma-
trix of A with row indices in I and column indices in J). Lastly,
x
$
←− S denotes that x is sampled uniformly at random from S.
2. NON INTERACTIVE AND QUADRATIC
COMMUNICATION CERTIFICATES
In this section, we propose two certificates, first for the column
(resp. row) rank profile, and, second, for the rank profile matrix.
While the certificates have a quadratic space communication com-
plexity, they have the advantage of being non-interactive.
2.1 Freivalds’ certificate for matrix product
In this paper, we will use Freivalds’ certificate [11] to verify
matrix multiplication. Considering three matrices A,B and C in
F
n×n, such that A × B = C, a straightforward way of verify-
ing the equality would be to perform the multiplication A×B and
to compare its result coefficient by coefficient with C. While this
method is deterministic, it has a time complexity of O(nω), which
is the matrix multiplication complexity. As such, it cannot be a
certificate, as there is no complexity difference between the com-
putation and the verification.
Prover Verifier
A,B ∈ Fn×n
C = AB
C
−→ v ∈ Fn×1
A(Bv)− Cv
?
= 0
Protocol 1: Freivalds’ certificate for matrix product
Freivalds’ certificate proposes a probabilistic method to check
this product in a time complexity of µ(A) + µ(B) + µ(C) using
matrix/vector multiplication, as detailed in Figure 1.
2.2 Column rank profile certificate
We now propose a certificate for the column rank profile.
Prover Verifier
A ∈ Fm×n
A PLUQ
decomposition of A
s.t. UQ is in row
echelon form
P,L,U,Q
−−−−→
UQ row echelonized?
A
?
= PLUQ, by cert. 1
Return Q[1], . . . , Q[r]
Protocol 2: Column rank profile, non-interactive
LEMMA 1. Let A = PLUQ be the PLUQ decomposition of
an m × n matrix A of rank r. If UQ is in row echelon form then
(Q[1], . . . , Q[r]) is the column rank profile of A.
PROOF. Write A = P
[
L1
L2
]
[ U1 U2 ]Q, where L1 and U1 are
r × r lower and upper triangular respectively. If UQ is in echelon
form, then R =
[
Ir U
−1
1 U2
0(m−r)×n
]
is in reduced echelon form. Now
[
U−11
Im−r
] [
L1
L2 Im−r
]−1
P TA =
[
U−11 UQ
0(m−r)×n
]
= R
is left equivalent to A and is therefore the echelon form of A.
Hence the sequence of column positions of the pivots in R, that
is (Q[1], . . . , Q[r]), is the column rank profile of A.
Lemma 1 provides a criterion to verify a column rank profile
from a PLUQ decomposition. Such decompositions can be com-
puted in practice by several variants of Gaussian elimination, with
no arithmetic overhead, as shown in [13] or [7, § 8]. Hence, we
propose the certificate in Protocol 2.
THEOREM 1. LetA ∈ Fm×n with r = rank(A). Certificate 2,
verifying the column rank profile ofA is sound, perfectly complete,
with a communication bounded by O(r(m + n)), a Prover com-
putation bounded by O(mnrω−2) and a Verifier computation cost
bounded by O(r(m+ n)) + µ(A).
PROOF. If the Prover is honest, then, UQ will be in row echelon
form and A = PLUQ, thus, by Lemma 1, the Verifier will be
able to read the column rank profile of A from Q. If the Prover is
dishonest, either A 6= PLUQ, which will be caught by the Prover
with probabilty p ≥ 1 − 1
q
using Freivalds’ certificate [11] or UQ
is not in row echelon from, which will be caught every time by the
Verifier.
The Prover sends P,L, U and Q to the Verifier, hence the com-
munication cost of O(r(m + n)), as P and Q are permutation
matrices and L, U , are respectively m × r and r × n matrices,
with r = rank(A). Using algorithms provided in [13], one can
compute the expected PLUQ decomposition inO(mnrω−2). The
Verifier has to check if A = PLUQ, and if UQ is in row echelon
form, which can be done in O(r(m+ n)).
Note that this holds for the row rank profile of A: in that case,
the Verifier has to check if PL is in column echelon form.
Algorithm Inter. Prover
Communication
Probabilistic
#F
Determ. Time Verifier Time
RANK
[14] over [1] No No O˜(rω + µ(A)) O˜(r2 +m+ n) O˜(r2 + µ(A)) ≥ 2
[4] Yes No O(n(µ(A) + n)) O(m+ n) 2µ(A) + O˜(m+ n) O˜(min{m, n})
[9] Yes Yes O(mnrω−2) O(m+ r) O(r + µ(A) +m+ n) ≥ 2
CRP/RRP
[14] over [16] No No O˜(rω +m+ n+ µ(A)) O˜(r2 +m+ n) O˜(r2 +m+ n+ µ(A)) O˜(min{m, n})
[14] over [13] No Yes O(mnrω−2) O˜(mn) O˜(mn) ≥ 2
RPM
[14] over [8] No No O˜(rω +m+ n+ µ(A)) O˜(r2 +m+ n) O˜(r2 +m+ n+ µ(A)) O˜(min{m, n})
[14] over [6] No Yes O(mnrω−2) O˜(mn) O˜(mn) ≥ 2
DET
[11] & PLUQ No Yes O(nω) O(n2) O(n2) + µ(A) ≥ 2
[5] & CHARPOLY Yes No O(nµ(A)) or O(nω) O(n) µ(A) + O(n) ≥ n2
Table 2: State of the art certificates for the rank, the row and column rank profiles, the rank profile matrix and the determinant
Algorithm Interactive Prover
Communication
Probabilistic
#F
Deterministic Time Verifier Time
CRP/RRP
§ 2.2 No Yes O(mnrω−2) O(r(m+ n)) O(r(m + n)) + µ(A) ≥ 2
§ 4.2 Yes Yes O(mnrω−2) O(m+ n) 2µ(A) +O(m+ n) ≥ 2
RPM
§ 2.3 No Yes O(mnrω−2) O(r(m+ n)) O(r(m + n)) + µ(A) ≥ 2
§ 4.3 Yes Yes O(mnrω−2) O(m+ n) 4µ(A) +O(m+ n) ≥ 4
DET § 4.1 & PLUQ Yes Yes O(nω) O(n) µ(A) + O(n) ≥ 2
Table 3: This paper’s contributions
2.3 Rank profile matrix certificate
LEMMA 2. A decompositionA = PLUQ reveals the rank pro-
file matrix, namelyRA = P
[
Ir
0
]
Q, if and only if P [ L 0 ]P T is
lower triangular and QT [ U0 ]Q is upper triangular.
PROOF. The only if case is proven in [8, Th. 21]. Now sup-
pose that P [ L 0m×(m−r) ]P T is lower triangular. Then we must
also have that L = P
[
L
0
Im−r
]
P T is lower triangular and non-
singular. Similarly suppose that QT [ U0 ]Q is upper triangular so
that U = QT
[
U
0 In−r
]
Q is non-singular upper triangular. We
have A = LP
[
Ir
0
]
QU . Hence the rank of any (i, j) leading
submatrix ofA is that of the (i, j) leading submatrix of P
[
Ir
0
]
Q,
thus proving thatRA = P
[
Ir
0
]
Q.
We use this characterization to verify the computation of the rank
profile matrix in the following protocol: Once the Verifier receives
P, L,U and Q, he has to:
1. Check that A = PLUQ, using Freivalds’ certificate [11]
2. Check that L is echelonized by P and UT by QT .
3. If successful, compute the rank profile matrix of A asRA =
P
[
Ir
0(m−r)×(n−r)
]
Q
Prover Verifier
A ∈ Fm×n
a PLUQ decomp.
of A revealing
RA.
P,L,U,Q
−−−−→ 1. A
?
= PLUQ by Protoc. 2.1
2. Is PLP T lower triangular?
3. IsQTUQ upper triangular?
Protocol 3: Rank profile matrix, non-interactive
THEOREM 2. Certificate 3 verifies the rank profile matrix of
A, it is sound and perfectly complete, with a communication cost
bounded by O(r(n +m)), a Prover computation cost bounded by
O(mnrω−2) and a Verifier computation cost bounded byO(r(m+
n)) + µ(A).
PROOF. If the Prover is honest, then, the provided PLUQ de-
composition is indeed a factorization ofA, which means Freivalds’
certificate will pass. It also means this PLUQ decomposition re-
veals the rank profile matrix. According to Lemma 2, PLP T will
be lower triangular and QTUQ upper triangular. Hence the ver-
ification will succeeds and RA = P
[
Ir
0(m−r)×(n−r)
]
Q is in-
deed the rank profile matrix of A. If the Prover is dishonest, either
A 6= PLUQ, which will be caught with probabilty p ≥ 1 − 1
q
by
Freivalds’ certificate or the PLUQ decomposition does not reveal
the rank profile matrix of A. In that case, Lemma 2 implies that
either P [ L 0 ]P T is not lower triangular or P [ U0 ]Q is not upper
triangular which the will be detected.
The Prover sends P,L, U and Q to the Verifier, hence the com-
munication cost of O((n+m)r). A rank profile matrix revealing
PLUQ decomposition can be computed in O(mnrω−2) opera-
tions [6]. The Verifier has to check if A = PLUQ, which can be
achieved in O((m+ n)r) + µ(A) field operations.
3. LINEAR COMMUNICATION CERTIFI-
CATE TOOLBOX
3.1 Triangular one sided equivalence
Two matrices A,B ∈ Fm×n are right (resp. left) equivalent if
there exist an invertible n × n matrix T such that AT = B (resp.
TA = B). If in addition T is a lower triangular matrix, we say
that A and B are lower triangular right (resp. left) equivalent. The
upper triangular right (resp. left ) equivalence is defined similarly.
We propose a certification protocol that two matrices are left or
right triangular equivalent. Here, A and B are input, known by the
Verifier and the Prover. A simple certificate would be the matrix T
itself, in which case the Verifier would check the product AT = B
using Freivalds’ certificate. This certificate is non-interactive and
requires a quadratic amount of communication. In what follows,
we present a certificate which allows to verify the one sided triangu-
lar equivalence without communicating T , requiring only 2n com-
munications. It is essentially a Freivalds’ certificate with a more
constrained interaction pattern in the way the challenge vector and
the response vector are communicated. This pattern imposes a tri-
angular structure in the way the Provers’ responses depend on the
Verifier challenges which match with the structure of the problem.
Prover Verifier
A,B ∈ Fm×n
A regular,m≥n
T lower triangular
matrix s.t. AT = B
1: T exists
−−−−−→
y1 = T1,∗
[
x1
0
...
] 2 : x1←−−− xi $←− S ⊂ F
3 : y1−−−→
...
...
yn = Tn,∗
[
x1
...
xn
] 2n : xn←−−−−
2n + 1 : yn
−−−−−−−→ y =
[
y1 .. yn
]T
Ay
?
= Bx
Protocol 4: Lower triang. right equivalence of regular matrices
THEOREM 3. Let A,B ∈ Fm×n, and assume A is regular.
Certificate 4 proves that there exists a lower triangular matrix T
such that AT = B. This certificate is sound, with probabilty
larger than 1 − 1
|S|
, perfectly complete, occupies 2n communica-
tion space, and can be computed in O(mnω−1) field operations
and verified in µ(A) + µ(B) field operations.
PROOF. If the Prover is honest, then AT = B and she just
computes y = Tx, so that Ay = ATx = Bx. If the Prover is
dishonest, replace the random values x1, . . . , xn by algebraically
independent variables X1, . . . , Xn. Since A is regular, there is a
unique n × n matrix T (that is, T = A†B with A† the Moore-
Penrose inverse of A) such that AT = B. For the same reason,
there is a unique vector Ŷ = A†BX such that AŶ = BX . The
vector Ŷ is then formed by n degree-1 polynomials inX1, . . . , Xn.
If T is not lower triangular, let i be the first row such that Ti,j 6= 0
for some j > i, and let jm be the largest such j. Then Ŷi has de-
gree 1 in Xjm . Let Y be the vector output by the Prover. At step
2i + 1, the value for Xjm was still not released, hence Yi is con-
stant in Xjm . As A is regular, the verification AY = BX = AŶ
is equivalent to Y − Ŷ = 0. The i-th component in this equation is
Yi − Ŷi = 0, whose left hand-side contains a non zero monomial
in Xj . There is therefore a probability lower than 1/|S| that the
random choice for xj makes this polynomial vanish.
This certificate requires to transmit x and y, which costs 2n in
communication. The Verifier has to compute Ay and Bx, whose
computational cost is µ(A) + µ(B). The Prover has to compute
T , this can be done by a PLUQ elimination on A followed by a tri-
angular system solve, both in O(mnω−1). Then y = Tx requires
only O(n2) operations.
Note that the case where T is upper triangular works similarly:
the Verifier needs to transmit x in reverse order, starting by xn.
3.2 Generic rank profile-ness
The problem here is to verify whether a non-singular input ma-
trixA ∈ Fm×n has generic rank profile (to test non-singularity, one
can apply beforehand the linear communication certificate in [4,
Fig. 2], see also Protocol 8 thereafter). A matrix A has generic
rank profile if and only if it has an LU decomposition A = LU ,
with L unit lower triangular and U non-singular upper triangular.
The protocol picks random vectors φ, ψ, λ and asks the Prover to
provide the vectors zT = λTL, x = Uφ, y = Uψ on the fly,
while receiving the coefficients of the vectors φ, ψ, λ one at a time.
These vectors satisfy the fundamental equations zTx = λTAφ and
zT y = λTAψ that will be checked by the Verifier.
Prover Verifier
A ∈ Fn×n
non-singular
A = LU
A has g.r.p.
−−−−−→
for i from n downto 1[
x y
]
= U
[
φ ψ
] φi,ψi←−−− (φi, ψi) $←− S2 ⊂ F2
xi,yi−−−→
zT = λTL
λi←− λi
$
←− S ⊂ F
zi−→
zT
[
x y
] ?
= (λTA)
[
φ ψ
]
Protocol 5: Generic rank profile with linear communication
THEOREM 4. Certificate 5 verifying that a non-singular matrix
has generic rank profile is sound, with probability larger than 1 −
1
|S|
, perfectly complete, communicates 3n field elements, and can
be computed in O(nω) field operations for the Prover and µ(A) +
8n field operations for the Verifier.
We will need the following Lemma, used in Dodgson determi-
nant condensation rule.
LEMMA 3 (DESNANOT-JACOBI, OR DODGSON RULE [3]).
[A]
{1..n}
{1..n} [A]
{2..n−1}
{2..n−1} =
∣∣∣∣∣ [A]
{1..n−1}
{1..n−1} [A]
{2..n}
{1..n−1}
[A]
{1..n−1}
{2..n} [A]
{2..n}
{2..n}
∣∣∣∣∣ .
Applying the same permutation, the cyclic shift of order 1 to the
left, on the rows and columns of A, yields the following formula
with no change of sign:
[A]
{1..n}
{1..n}
[A]
{1..n−2}
{1..n−2}
=
∣∣∣∣∣ [A]
{1..n−2,n}
{1..n−2,n} [A]
{1..n−1}
{1..n−2,n}
[A]
{1..n−2,n}
{1..n−1}
[A]
{1..n−1}
{1..n−1}
∣∣∣∣∣ . (1)
PROOF OF THEOREM 4. The protocol is perfectly complete: if
A = LU , then zT
[
x y
]
= λTLU
[
φ ψ
]
= λTA
[
φ ψ
]
.
Now, for the soundness, replace every φ, ψ, λ chosen at random
by the Verifier by vectors of algebraically independent variables
Φ,Ψ,Λ. Similarly, the responses of the Prover z, x, y are now vec-
tors of algebraically independent variables Z,X, Y . Under the as-
sumption of the success of the Verifier test,{
ZTX = ΛTAΦ
ZTY = ΛTAΨ
, (2)
and that A is non-singular, we will prove the following induction
hypothesis:
Hi :

ZTi...nXi...n =
1
di−1
∑
i≤j,k≤n Λk [A]
{1...i−1,k}
{1...i−1,j}
Φj
ZTi...nYi...n =
1
di−1
∑
i≤j,k≤n Λk [A]
{1...i−1,k}
{1...i−1,j} Ψj
dj 6= 0 ∀j < i
where di = [A]
{1...i}
{1...i}
, d0 = 1.
For i = 1, note that [A]
{1...i−1,k}
{1...i−1,j} = Ak,j , hence the right hand-
sides of the first two equations of H1 can be written as:∑
1≤j,k≤n ΛkAk,jΦj = Λ
TAΦ = ZTX∑
1≤j,k≤n ΛkAk,jΨj = Λ
TAΨ = ZT Y
by (2). Finally d0 = 1 is obviously nonzero.
Now suppose Hi is true for some 0 ≤ i < n. Then
ZiXi + Z
T
i+1..nXi+1..n =
1
di−1
Λi
∑n
j=i [A]
{1..i}
{1..i−1,j} Φj
+ 1
di−1
∑n
j=i
∑n
k=i+1 Λk [A]
{1..i−1,k}
{1..i−1,j} Φj
ZiYi + Z
T
i+1..nYi+1..n =
1
di−1
Λi
∑n
j=i [A]
{1..i}
{1..i−1,j}
Ψj
+ 1
di−1
∑n
j=i
∑n
k=i+1 Λk [A]
{1..i−1,k}
{1..i−1,j} Ψj
.
(3)
At the time of choosing the value for Λi, all variables are set,
except Zi. Hence for all value assigned to Λi, there is a value for
Zi that satisfies the above system of two linear equations in Zi and
Λi. Consequently this system is singular and the following two
determinants vanish:∣∣∣∣∣ di−1Xi
∑n
j=i [A]
{1..i}
{1..i−1,j}
Φj
di−1Yi
∑n
j=i [A]
{1..i}
{1..i−1,j}Ψj
∣∣∣∣∣ = 0 (4)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
j=i
[A]
{1..i}
{1..i−1,j} Φj di−1Z
T
i+1..nXi+1..n − FA(Λ, i,Φ)
n∑
j=i
[A]
{1..i}
{1..i−1,j}Ψj di−1Z
T
i+1..nYi+1..n − FA(Λ, i,Ψ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= 0
(5)
where FA(Λ, i, R) =
∑n
j=i
∑n
k=i+1 Λk [A]
{1..i−1,k}
{1..i−1,j} Rj , forR =
Φ,Ψ. Actually, Equation (5) is thus of the form
∣∣∣∣ diΦi + b aΦi + ediΨi + c aΨi + f
∣∣∣∣ =
0 where di = [A]
{1..i}
{1..i}, a = −
∑n
k=i+1 Λk [A]
{1..i−1,k}
{1..i} and
b, c, e, f are constants with respect to the variables Φi,Ψi.
If di = 0, then, at least one [A]
{1..i}
{1..i−1,j} for j > i must be
nonzero, otherwise A would be singular. Similarly, at least one
[A]
{1..i−1,k}
{1..i} for k > i is nonzero, hence a is a nonzero polynomial
in Λi+1, . . . ,Λn and b, c are nonzero polynomials in Φj ,Ψj for
j > i, but constant in Φi and Ψi. This is a contradiction, as the
first column of the determinant,
[
b
c
]
can not be colinear with the
second one. Hence di 6= 0.
Therefore
[
e
f
]
= a
di
[
b
c
]
which is
di−1Z
T
i+1..nXi+1..n =
1
di
∑n
j,k=i+1 Λk
(
di [A]
{1..i−1,k}
{1..i−1,j}
− [A]
{1..i−1,k}
{1..i}
[A]
{1..i}
{1..i−1,j}
)
Φj
di−1Z
T
i+1..nYi+1..n =
1
di
∑n
j,k=i+1 Λk
(
di [A]
{1..i−1,k}
{1..i−1,j}
− [A]
{1..i−1,k}
{1..i}
[A]
{1..i}
{1..i−1,j}
)
Ψj
Applying variant (1) of Lemma 3 to [A]
{1..i,k}
{1..i,j}
, yields{
di−1Z
T
i+1..nXi+1..n =
1
di
∑n
j,k=i+1 Λkdi−1 [A]
{1..i,k}
{1..i,j}
Φj
di−1Z
T
i+1..nYi+1..n =
1
di
∑n
j,k=i+1 Λkdi−1 [A]
{1..i,k}
{1..i,j} Ψj
and Hi+1 is verified.
We have proven that if Hi is true, then either Hi+1 is also true
or the system (3) has a single solution and the Verifier randomly
chose precisely that λi. Therefore, suppose that A has not generic
rank profile, it means that some dj = 0 and Hj is false. But the
Verifier checks thatH1 is true. If this is the case, then at least once,
did the Verifier choose the value expected by the dishonest Prover.
This happens with probability lower than 1/|S|.
Finally, for the complexity, the Prover needs one Gaussian elim-
ination to compute LU in time O(nω), then her extra work is just
three triangular solve in O(n2). The extra communication is three
vectors, φ, ψ, λ, and the Verifier’s work is four dot-products and
one multiplication by the initial matrix A.
3.3 LDUP decomposition
With Protocol 5, when the matrix A does not have generic rank
profile, any attempt to prove that it has generic rank profile will be
detected w.h.p. (soundness). However when it is the case, the ver-
ification will accept many possible vectors x, y, z: any scaling of
zi by αi and xi, yi by 1/αi would be equally accepted for any non
zero constants αi. This slack correspond to our lack of specification
of the diagonals’ shape in the used LU decomposition. Indeed, for
any diagonal matrix with non zero elements, LD ×D−1U is also
a valid LU decomposition and yields x, y and z scaled as above.
Specifying these diagonals is not necessary to prove generic rank
profileness, so we left it as is for this task.
However, for the determinant or the rank profile matrix certifi-
cates of Sections 4.1 and 4.3, we will need to ensure that this scal-
ing is independent from the choice of the vectors φ, ψ, λ. Hence
we propose an updated protocol, where L has to be unit diagonal,
and the prover has to first commit the main diagonal D of U .
For an n × n triangular matrix T , its strictly triangular part is
denoted T˜ ∈ F(n−1)×(n−1): for instance if T is upper triangular,
then t˜i,j = ti,j+1 for j ≥ i and 0 otherwise.
For U an invertible upper triangular matrix we have for its di-
agonal (d1, . . . , dn) and the associated diagonal matrix D, that
U1 = D
−1U is unitary. Thus, for any Fn ∋ ψ = [ψ1, ψ˜]
T :
Uψ = DU1ψ = D
(
ψ +
[
U˜1ψ˜
0
])
.
So the idea is that the Prover will commitD beforehand, and that
within a generic rank profile certificate, the Verifier will only com-
municate φ˜, ψ˜ and λ˜ to obtain z˜ = λ˜T L˜, x˜ = U˜1φ˜ and y˜ = U˜1ψ˜.
Then the Verifier will compute by herself the complete vectors.
This ensures that L is unitary and that U = DU1 with U1 unitary.
Finally, if an invertible matrix does not have generic rank pro-
file, we note that it is also possible to incorporate the permutations,
by committing them in the beginning and reapplying them to the
matrix during the checks. The full certificate is given in Figure 6.
THEOREM 5. The Protocol of Figure 6, committing a permu-
tation matrix P and a diagonal matrix D for an invertible matrix
A, such that there exists unitary triangular matrices L and U with
A = LDUP , is sound, with probability larger than 1 − 1
|S|
, and
perfectly complete. For an n×n matrix, it requires less than 8n
extra communications and the computational cost for the Verifier is
bounded by µ(A) + 12n+ o(n).
PROOF. If the Prover is honest, then A = LUP = LDU1P , so
that for any choice of λ and ψ we have: λTAP Tψ = λTLDU1ψ,
that is
[
λ˜T λn
] (
I +
[
0 0
L˜ 0
])
D
([
0 U˜
0 0
]
+ I
) [ ψ˜
ψn
]
= zT y and
the same is true for λ and φ, so that the protocol is perfectly com-
plete.
Now, the last part of the Protocol of Figure 6 is actually a verifi-
cation that AP T has generic rank profile, in other words that there
exists lower and upper triangular matrices L∗ and U∗ such that
AP T = L∗U∗. This verification is sound by Theorem 4. Next,
Prover Verifier
A ∈ Fn×n non-singular
A = LDUP
P,D
−−−−−−−−→ P
?
∈ Sn,D
?
∈ Dn(F)
Choose S ⊂ F
.
.
. for i from n downto 2:[
x˜ y˜
]
← U˜1
[
φ˜ ψ˜
] φi,ψi←−−−−−−−− φi, ψi $←− S2
xi−1,yi−1
−−−−−−−−→
z˜ ← λ˜T L˜
λi←−−−−−−−− λi
$
←− S
zi−1
−−−−−−−−→
.
.
.
φ1, ψ1, λ1
$
←− S3[
x y
]
←
[
φ ψ
]
+
[
x˜ y˜
0 0
]
zT ←
(
λT +
[
z˜T 0
])
zTD
[
x y
] ?
= (λTA)PT
[
φ ψ
]
Protocol 6: LDUP decomposition (linear communication)
the multiplication by the diagonal D is performed by the Verifier,
so he is actually convinced that there exists lower and upper trian-
gular matrices L∗ and U∗1 such that AP
T = L∗DU∗1 . Finally, the
construction of the vectors with the form a +
[
b˜
0
]
is also done by
the Verifier, so he in fact has a guaranty that L∗ and U∗1 are unitary.
Overall, if the Prover is dishonest, the Verifier will catch him
with the probability of Theorem 4.
Finally, for the complexity bounds, the extra communications
are: one permutation matrix P , a diagonal matrix D and 6 vectors
λ˜, φ˜, ψ˜ and z˜, x˜ and y˜. That is n non-negative integers lower than
n and 6(n − 1) + n field elements. The arithmetic computations
of the Verifier are one multiplication by a diagonal matrix, 3 vector
sums, 4 dot-products and one matrix-vector multiplication by A
(for (λTA)), that is n+ 3(n− 1) + 4(2n− 1).
We, furthermore, have some guaranties on the actual values of
x, y, z:
PROPOSITION 1. Let S be a finite subset of F in Protocol 6, if[
x y
]
6= U1
[
φ ψ
]
then the verification will pass with probability
at most 2
|S|
.
PROOF. Equation (4) implies that, if the verification check pas-
ses, with (z, x, y), then the vector
[
xi yi
]T
must be co-linear with
the right column of this determinant, that can be written in the form[
diφi + b diψi + c
]T
with di 6= 0 and b and c depending only
on φk, ψk, xk, yk, λk, zk with k > i. Hence, any value x˜i, y˜i,
supplied by the Prover, must satisfy∣∣∣∣φi + x˜i diφi + bψi + y˜i diψi + c
∣∣∣∣ = 0, (6)
when φi and ψi are still unknown. This condition is ensured for
any φi and ψi if and only if
[
x˜i y˜i
]
= 1
di
[
b c
]
. If the Prover
is dishonest and if
[
x y
]
6= U1
[
φ ψ
]
then at least one couple
(x˜i, y˜i) is incorrect. Then, either the Verifier has chosen a couple
of values (φi, ψi) making the degree 1 determinant (6) vanish, this
happens with probability at most 1/|S|, or System (3) has a unique
solution (zi, λi). But if the latter is true and the final check suc-
ceeds then, as for Theorem 4, at least once the Prover chose to have
1/|S| chances that the Verifier picked the unique possibility for λj ,
i ≥ j ≥ 1. Overall, the Verification thus fails with probability at
most 1− 2
|S|
.
REMARK 1. Correctness of the vector z can also be ensured
with the same probability: for the singular System (3), with respect
to the unknowns Λi and Zi, to have rank at least one, it is sufficient
that one of Xi or Yi is non zero. The Verifier, knowing x˜i, can
ensure this by restricting the set of choices for φi ∈ S\{−x˜i}.
Thus if xi and yi are correct, the Prover will have to provide a
correct associated zi or increase the probability of being caught.
4. LINEARCOMMUNICATION INTERAC-
TIVE CERTIFICATES
In this section, we give linear space communication certificates
for the determinant, the column/row rank profile of a matrix, and
for the rank profile matrix.
4.1 Linear communication certificate for the
determinant
Existing certificates for the determinant are either optimal for
the Prover in the dense case, using the strategy of [14, Theorem 5]
over a PLUQ decomposition, but quadratic in communication; or
linear in communication, using [5, Theorem 14], but using a reduc-
tion to the characteristic polynomial. In the sparse case the deter-
minant and the characteristic polynomial both reduce to the same
minimal polynomial computations and therefore the latter certifi-
cate is currently optimal for the Prover. Now in the dense case,
while the determinant and characteristic polynomial both reduce to
matrix multiplication, the determinant, via a single PLUQ decom-
position is more efficient in practice [15]. Therefore, we propose
here an alternative in the dense case: use only one PLUQ decom-
position for the Prover while keeping linear extra communications
and O(n) + µ(A) operations for the Verifier. The idea is to extract
the information of a LDUP decomposition without communicating
it: one uses Protocol 6 for A = LDUP with L and U unitary, but
kept on the Prover side, and then the Verifier only has to compute
Det(A) = Det(D)Det(P ), with n−1 additional field operations.
COROLLARY 1. For an n×n matrix, there exists a sound and
perfectly complete protocol for the determinant over a field using
less than 8n extra communications and with computational cost for
the Verifier bounded by µ(A) + 13n + o(n).
As a comparison, the protocol of [5, Theorem 14] reduces to CHAR-
POLY instead of PLUQ for the Prover, requires 5n extra communi-
cations and µ(A)+ 13n+ o(n) operations for the Verifier as well.
Also the new protocol requires 3n random field elements for any
field, where that of [5, Theorem 14] requires 3 random elements
but a field larger than n2.
For instance, using the routines shown in Table 1, the determi-
nant of an 50k×50k random dense matrix can be computed in
about 24 minutes, where with the certificate of Figure 6, the over-
head of the Prover is less than 5s and the Verifier time is about 1s.
4.2 Column or row rank profile certificate
In Figure 7 and 8, we first recall the two linear time and space
certificates for an upper and a lower bound to the rank that consti-
tute a rank certificate. We present here the variant sketched in [9,
§ 2] of the certificates of [4]. An upper bound r on the rank is cer-
tified by the capacity for the Prover to generate any vector sampled
from the image of A by a linear combination of r column of A.
A lower bound r is certified by the capacity for the Prover to re-
cover the unique coefficients of a linear combination of r linearly
independent columns of A.
Prover Verifier
A ∈ Fm×n
r s.t. rank(A) ≤ r
r
−→
Choose S ⊂ F
w
←− v
$
←− Sn, w = Av
Aγ = w
γ
−→ |γ|H
?
= r
Aγ
?
= w
Protocol 7: Upper bound on the rank of a matrix
THEOREM 6. Let A ∈ Fm×n, and let S be a finite subset of F.
The interactive certificate 7 of an upper bound for the rank of A is
sound, with probability larger than 1− 1
|S|
, perfectly complete, oc-
cupies 2n communication space, can be computed inLINSY S(r)
and verified in 2µ(A) + n time.
Prover Verifier
A ∈ Fm×n
c1, .., cr indep. cols of A
c1, .., cr−−−−−→
Choose S ⊂ F
v
←− α =
{
αcj
$
←− S∗
0 otherwise
v = Aα
Solve Aβ = v
β
−→ β
?
= α
Protocol 8: Lower bound on the rank of a matrix
THEOREM 7. Let A ∈ Fm×n, and let S be a finite subset of
F. The interactive certificate 8 of a lower bound for the rank of A
is sound, , with probability larger than 1− 1
|S|
, perfectly complete
and occupies n + 2r communication space, can be computed in
LINSY S(r) and verified in µ(A) + r operations.
We now consider a column rank profile certificate: the Prover is
given a matrix A, and answers the column rank profile of A, J =
(c1, . . . , cr). In order to certify this column rank profile, we need
to certify two properties:
1. the columns given by J are linearly independent;
2. the columns given by J form the lexicographically smallest
set of independent columns of A.
Property 1 is verified by Certificate 8, as it checks wether a set of
columns are indeed linearly independent. Property 2 could be cer-
tified by successive applications of Certificate 7: at step i, checking
that the rank of A∗,(0,...,ci−1) is at most i − 1 would certify that
there is no column located between ci−1 and ci in A which in-
creases the rank of A. Hence, it would prove the minimality of J .
However, this method requires O(nr) communication space.
Instead, we reduce these communication by seeding all chal-
lenges from a single n dimensional vector, and by compressing the
responses with a random projection. The right triangular equiv-
alence certificate plays here a central role, ensuring the lexico-
graphic minimality of S . More precisely, the Verifier chooses a
vector v ∈ Fn uniformly at random and sends it to the Prover.
Then, for each index ck ∈ S the Prover computes the linear com-
bination of the first ck − 1 columns of A using the first ck − 1
coefficients of v and has to prove that it can be generated from the
k−1 columns c1, . . . , ck−1. This means, find a vector γ
(k) solution
to the system:
[
A∗,c1 A∗,c2 . . . A∗,ck−1
]
γ(k) = A
 v1...vck−1
0
...
 .
Equivalently, find a strictly upper triangular matrix Γ such that:
[
A∗,c1 A∗,c2 . . . A∗,cr−1
]
Γ = A

v1 v1 ··· ··· v1
...
...
...
...
...
vc1−1
...
...
...
...
0 vc2−1
...
...
...
0 0
...
...
...
0 0 0 vcr−1
...
0 0 0 0 vn

︸ ︷︷ ︸
V
.
Note that V = Diag(v1, . . . , vn)W where W = [1i<cj+1 ]i,j
(with cr+1 = n + 1 by convention) In order to avoid having to
transmit the whole r×r upper triangular matrix Γ, the Verifier only
checks a random projection x of it, using the triangular equivalence
Certificate 4. We then propose the certificate in Figure 9.
Prover Verifier
A ∈ Fm×n
(c1, .., cr) CRP ofA
(c1, .., cr)
−−−−−−→ rankA
?
≥ r by Cert. 8
Choose S ⊂ F
v
←− v
$
←− Sn
V = Diag(vi)W W = [1i<cj+1 ]
Γ upper tri. s.t.
A∗,{c1,..,cr}Γ =
AV
D ← Diag(vi)
y = Γx
x (Cert. 4) y
←−−−−−→ x
$
←− Sr
z ← D(Wx)
zcj ← zcj−yj , j = 1..r
Az
?
= 0
Protocol 9: Certificate for the column rank profile
THEOREM 8. For A ∈ Fm×n and S ⊂ F, certificate 9 is
sound, with probability larger than 1− 1
|S|
, perfectly complete, with
a Prover computational cost bounded by O(mnrω−2), a commu-
nication space complexity bounded by 2n + 4r and a Verifier cost
bounded by 2µ(A) + n+ 3r.
PROOF. If the Prover is honest, the protocol corresponds first to
an application of Theorem 7 to certify that J is a set of indepen-
dent columns. This certificate is perfectly complete. Second the
protocol also uses challenges from Certificate 7, which is perfectly
complete, together with Certificate 4, which is perfectly complete
as well. The latter certificate is used on A∗,J , a regular subma-
trix, as J is a set of independent columns of A. The final check
then corresponds to A(D(Wx))− A∗,{c1,..cr}y
?
= 0 and, overall,
Certificate 9 is perfectly complete.
If the Prover is dishonest, then either the set of columns in J
are not linearly independent, which will be caught by the Verifier
with probability at least 1 − 1
|S|
, from Theorem 7, or J is not
lexicographically minimal, or the rank of A is not r. If the rank
is wrong, it will not be possible for the prover to find a suitable Γ.
This will be caught by the verifier with probability 1 − 1
|S|
, from
Theorem 3. Finally, if J is not lexicographically minimal, there
exists at least one column ck /∈ J , ci < ck < ci+1 for some fixed
i such that {c1, . . . , ci} ∪ {ck} form a set of linearly independant
columns of A. This means that rank(A∗,1,...,ci+1−1) = i + 1,
whereas it was expected to be i. Thus, the prover cannot reconstruct
a suitable triangular Γ and this will be detected by the verifier also
with probability 1− 1
|S|
, as shown in Theorem 3).
The Prover’s time complexity is that of computing a PLUQ de-
composition of A. The transmission of v, x and y yields a com-
munication space of n+ 2r. Finally, in addition to Protocol 8, the
Verifier computesWx as a prefix sum with r − 1 additions, multi-
plies it byD, then substracts yi at the r correct positions and finally
multiplies byA for a total cost bounded by 2µ(A)+n+3r−1.
4.3 Rank profile matrix certificate
We propose an interactive certificate for the rank profile matrix
based on [8, Algorithm 4]: first computing the row and column sup-
port of the rank profile matrix, using Certificate 9 twice for the row
and column rank profiles, then computing the rank profile matrix
of the invertible submatrix of A lying on this grid.
In the following we then only focus on a certificate for the rank
profile matrix of an invertible matrix. It relies on an LUP decom-
position that reveals the rank profile matrix. From Theorem 2, this
is the case if and only if P TUP is upper triangular. Protocol 10
thus gives an interactive certificate that combines Certificate 6 for a
LDUP decomposition with a certificate that P TUP is upper trian-
gular. The latter is achieved by Certificate 4 showing that P T and
P TU are left upper triangular equivalent, but since U is unknown
to the Verifier, the verification is done on a random right projection
with the vector φ used in Certificate 6.
Prover Verifier
A ∈ Fn×n invertible
A = LDUP ,
with P = RA
P,D
−−−→ P
?
∈ Sn, D
?
∈ Dn(F)
Protocol 4 : PT and PTU are left up. tri. equiv. with random proj.
U ← P TUP
U is upper tri.
−−−−−−−→
Choose S ⊂ F
ei←− for i = 1..n, ei
$
←− S
fT ← eTU
fi−→
Protocol 6 on A
[ φ˜ ψ˜ ]
←−−−−
[ x˜ y˜ ]
−−−→
φ, ψ
$
←− Sn
Now
[
x y
]
= U
[
φ ψ
]
eTP Tx
?
= fTP Tφ
Protocol 10: Rank profile matrix of an invertible matrix
THEOREM 9. Protocol 10 is sound, with probability greater
than 1 − 2
|S|
, and perfectly complete. The Prover cost is O(nω)
field operations, the communication space is bounded by 10n and
the Verifier cost is bounded by µ(A) + 16n.
PROOF. If the Prover is dishonest and U = P TUP is not up-
per triangular, then let (i, j) be the lexicographically minimal co-
ordinates such that i > j and U i,j 6= 0. Now either
[
x y
]
6=
U
[
φ ψ
]
, and the verification will then fail to detect it with proba-
bility less than 2
|S|
, from Proposition 1. Or one can write eTP Tx−
fTP Tφ = (eTU − fT )Pφ = 0. If
eTP TUP − fT = 0. (7)
is not satisfied, then a random φwill fail to detect it with probability
less than 1
|S|
, since e, U and f are set before choosing for φ. At the
time of commiting fj , the value of ei is still unknown, hence fj
is constant in the symbolic variable Ei. Thus the j-th coordinate
in (7) is a nonzero polynomial in Ej and therefore vanishes with
probability 1/|S| when sampling the values of e uniformly. Hence,
overall if P TUP is not upper triangular, the verification will fail to
detect it with probability at most 2/|S|.
Finally, the rank profile matrix of any matrix, even a singular
one, can thus be verified with two applications of Certificate 9
(one for the row rank profile and one for the column rank profile,
themselves calling Certificate 8 only once), followed by Certifi-
cate 10 on the r×r selection of lexicographically minimal inde-
pendent rows and columns. Overall this is 4µ(A) + 2n + 21r
operations for the Verifier, and 3n+ 16r communications.
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